Governments that privatize state industries often retain control over key distribution assets. While there are many examples of this form of partial privatization, to our knowledge there are no substantial quantitative studies of how governments use their control under these circumstances. In this paper we argue that the Russian government privatization of the oil sector during 1994-2003 is a useful case study because the federal government privatized oil production but retained monopoly control rights over the transport of crude onto world markets. Based on a simple analysis of the costs and benefits of control and ownership, we argue that that in these circumstances the federal government would use its control over transport capacity to provide privileged access to those companies over which it has influence. We find that in 2003 this is indeed the case and that this system detracted from economic efficiency. In particular, private and regionally owned companies had to be much more productive than companies over which the federal government (the state) had influence to receive comparable access to world markets; state-influence companies had preferential access to routes with more capacity; and, the allocation of route capacity was sensitive to transport costs only in the stateinfluence sector.
Introduction
Governments around the world have been privatizing large state owned enterprises in sectors that are of national strategic importance including oil, gas and electricity. Many of these privatizations have effectively been "partial" because national governments either manage to keep a major stake in the privatized companies or often retain control of a strategic distribution method even for fully privatized companies (Megginson, 2005) . For example, the state share is remarkably large in some local gas and oil giants including Petrobras in Brazil (32%), Eni in Italy (36.9%) and Sinopec in China (77.4%). In India, the generation of electricity has been privatized, but the transmission of electricity is monopolized by government electricity boards. It has been alleged that that Indian national government uses its control over transmission to force privatized generating companies to supply electricity to poor rural areas at below-market prices and at high cost because there is poor transmission equipment and theft from the transmission lines in these rural areas (Smith, 1993) .
There has been a considerable body of work on how the state uses or abuses its powers in privatization programs where it manages to obtain substantial ownership positions in privatized companies (see Megginson, 2005 for a summary). However, there
are not, to our knowledge, any quantitative studies of how governments behave in a partial privatization in which they retain control over strategic distribution assets. This is surprising since there are many examples of this including the privatization of electricity in India and the small privatization program in Russia where local governments often retained de facto control rights by retaining de jure ownership of the land on which newly privatized shops operated (see Barberis et al, 1996) . 1 In this paper we argue that the privatization of the Russian oil sector during 1994-
2003 is a useful case study of how governments use their control rights over strategic distribution assets during a privatization. Following the demise of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the emerging Russian federal government gained jurisdiction over the major oil fields in Russia; and, it also retained control over the transport of oil exports from both Russia and many of the newly independent countries. Starting in 1994 many former state oil companies were privatized. This privatization has been partial because the federal government has obtained ownership positions in several companies and has also retained full control over the transport of oil onto lucrative world markets. In this paper, then, we seek to understand if the state effectively uses its control over the export pipeline to discriminate between fully privatized companies and those companies in which it has substantial ownership positions. And, we check whether government control over the oil export pipeline promotes or detracts from efficiency.
The theoretical analysis in Grossman and Hart (1986) and then in Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) suggests that the federal government would tend to impose tight quotas and extract rents from companies over which it has limited influence (for herein state-independent firms) versus those over which it has influence (for herein denoted state-influence firms). The idea is that the federal government can hold up any company using its control over a key distribution asset, which in the case of the Russian crude oil sector is the transport pipeline. Companies are differentiated by their ownership rights over residual cash flows. There are fully private companies (e.g., Yukos) in which outsiders have full cash flow rights. There are other companies (e.g., LUKoil or Tatneft) where the federal government or some regional government have substantial or even close to full cash flow rights. When the federal government imposes quotas on enterprises over which it has some cash flow rights, it must also bear the financial costs of this diversion of oil from lucrative world markets. This implies that the federal government is more likely to impose costly regulation on companies owned largely by outside investors and regional governments.
In this paper we check for the differential treatment of state-independent versus state-influence firms. We find that by 2003, in fact, state-influence firms have privileged access to state controlled export markets and that this privilege detracted from efficiency.
In particular, state-independent companies had to be much more productive than stateinfluence companies to receive comparable access to world markets; state-influence companies had preferential access to routes with more capacity; and, the allocation of route capacity was sensitive to transport costs only in the state-influence sector.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next Section describes the evolution of ownership and structure in the Russian oil sector; Section 3 describes how the federal government controls transport of oil to world markets; Section 4 sketches a simple theory of partial privatization that generates the hypothesis that export allocations are tighter in state-independent versus state-influence companies; Section 5 describes our data for testing this hypothesis; Section 6 presents our results about the differential treatment of state-independent versus state-influence companies; and Section 7 concludes.
Ownership and Structure
This section describes ownership trends and structural dynamics in Russia's crude oil sector. We develop a typology of company ownership based on state shares and federal government representation on company boards. We argue that Russian oil companies can be classified as either private, private with regional government influence, private with federal government influence or state companies and that it is appropriate to refer to the latter two forms of companies as state-influence companies. We also show that the expansion of state-independent companies was more likely to be based on efficiency considerations than the expansion of state-influence companies.
Ownership. Privatization of the oil sector was regulated by Presidential
Ordinance #1403 approved on November 17, 1992 (President of Russian Federation, 1992). Vertically-integrated companies (for herein, we will often use the Russian expression and call them "mothers") were created by joining some oil-producing enterprises and refineries into open-stock companies 2 . The shares of the newly-created mothers were distributed through several complex and frequently nontransparent auctions. The insiders who were allowed to participate in the bidding gained control over mothers with huge potential value in exchange for relatively small cash amounts (Megginson, 2005) . Some of the smaller oil-producing enterprises were also transformed into open-stock companies and then later either became absorbed by a mother and/or had their stock allocations sold in an auction, or became joint ventures.
The privatization of the oil sector mothers during 1997-2003 was partial because the federal government managed to maintain some substantial ownership positions. As is documented in Table 1, during 1997-2003 there were three types of vertically-integrated oil companies: those fully owned by outside investors, companies where the federal government had majority or substantial minority shareholder positions (denoted F in Table 1 ) and companies where regional governments had substantial ownership (denoted as R in Table 1 ). In 1997 only four of the thirteen mothers were fully owned by outside investors, seven companies were either fully or partially owned by the federal government and two were owned by regional governments (the Repubic of Tatarstan owned 30-% of Tatneft and the Republic of Bashkotorstan owned 63-% of Bashneft).
By 1999 the federal government had managed to preserve its significant ownership positions in the crude oil production sector; and, the federal government had also placed its representatives on the Boards of Directors (herein Boards) of the companies where it had ownership. In most of the cases, the federal government representatives were from the agencies that oversaw the oil sector. For example, LUKoil's Board of 1999 included the Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy, which at the time was responsible for allocating pipeline capacity for exports (see section 3). Another member of the Board was the top manager of the State Antimonopoly Committee, which had the responsibility of ensuring that large companies such as the oil mothers engaged in competitive business practice. Hence, federal representation on boards allowed the state not only to directly influence the mothers' decisions, but also established connections between mothers and the federal agencies with substantial influence over the crude oil sector.
The regional governments also had influence on decisions of the mothers in which they had substantial ownership positions. However, we found no evidence that the local governments had any connections to the federal agencies that supervised the oil sector.
Moreover, the regional governments in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan were highly independent and often pursued policies that conflicted with federal rules (see Treisman, 1999 In summary, this section has made several points about ownership and structure in the Russian oil sector. First, the privatization was partial and vertically-integrated companies in the crude oil sector can be divided into state-influence companies and stateindependent companies. Second, after privatization, the oil sector was highly concentrated and its concentration increased over time. Third, companies that remained state-independent used economic criterion in their expansions in 1997-2003..
Control
In this section we argue that the federal government has the power to control exports because of its almost complete monopoly position as transporter of crude oil onto domestic-CIS and world markets. Because selling crude at world market is preferred to selling it domestically (due to substantial price spreads during 1997 and 2003 and non-payment problems in domestic and CIS markets), we argue that this ability to control exports gives the federal government considerable leverage over all companies.
The profits of Russian oil mothers depend very much on their crude exports. As it is documented in Table 5 Over 95% of total crude exports from Russia are transported through a system of trunk pipelines. The system is state-owned and operated by a 100% federally-owned company, Transneft 4 . Hence, the federal government has almost complete monopoly control over Russian oil exports. This extent of federal power is unusual. In most countries where oil production is private, oil transportation is also privately provided. For example, in the United States the system of trunk pipelines is owned and operated by over 3, 000 companies, some of which are oil producers, others have no relation to oil
production (Office of Pipeline Safety Communications, 2005). This is also true for
Norway where all the segments of its complex oil transportation system are operated by oil producers working in the country (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2005).
According to independent experts, the Transneft pipeline system had in 2001 the capacity to ship roughly 153-154 million tons per year (Oil and Capital, 2001 ). Since 2002, Transneft trunk pipelines have been operating at full capacity (Oil and Capital, 2004) . As a result of system overload, available throughput capacity has to be rationed between the companies. The federal government thus has tremendous control over the crude oil sector because of its ability to allocate highly valuable capacity to export.
The export quotas allocation rules were introduced in 1994 and stayed practically unchanged through 2003 (Government of Russian Federation, 1994). According to the official laws on the books, export pipeline capacity is allocated between the oil companies according to a grandfathering rule: each company's quota is determined by its production in the past quarter. In particular, the allocation quotas depend on three factors:
the capacity of the Transneft system, the production of an exporter in the previous quarter and, since 1997, her tax arrears (Government of Russian Federation, 1997). This formal allocation rule does not depend on the willingness of oil producers to pay for capacity and so does not promote efficiency. The rules also appear to be quite vague as to the exact relationships between past production, route capacity and current export access.
Contrary to the unchanged allocation rules, the agencies enforcing them changed The Ministry of Fuel and Energy was controlled mostly by former Soviet officials.
Berkowitz (2000) documents that in 1995-1996 access to the oil pipeline was highly political. In particular, he noted that bribes and political favors played an important role in determining the size of the final quota. Furthermore, he also found that it is difficult to separate the impact of rules from the impact of the political influence that a company enjoys from being large on export allocations.
In Allocating export quotas between the companies is not the only way the state can control the oil producers. It is important to mention that Russian crude can be exported through several routes that are differentiated by cost. Thus, not only volume of the quota matters to a producer, but also WHERE this volume is allocated to be shipped.
Specifically, Russian crude is exported through ports and the pipeline sub-system called Druzhba that delivers oil directly to European refineries (see Figure 1 ). Over half of the total Russian crude exports go through sea ports since exports through the Druzhba subsystem are constrained by the capacity of the European refineries to which it is connected. In 1997 four ports were exporting Russian crude: Russian Novorossyisk and The export costs of different routes can be roughly estimated by using the costs of delivering oil to a refinery or a port and the costs of oil transshipment in the port. The costs of shipping oil are determined by the operators of the pipelines. Oil transshipment costs are separately determined in each port. They include costs of transferring oil from a pipeline to a terminal and then to a tanker. The export and transshipment costs at different export routers are presented in Table 6 . The table shows that Transneft (the operator of the Russian pipeline system) offers the best transit tariffs and that working with nonRussian countries adds substantial costs. Hence, the Druzhba route to Europe is the cheapest since the producers only have to pay transit costs and avoid transshipment costs.
However, because of the capacity constraints of the European refineries, this route may not be the most profitable since it allows exporting limited volumes of crude. Among the sea exporting terminals, Russian ports charge relatively small transshipment costs. This makes Russian ports the most desirable among sea export routes.
In summary, the Russian oil transport system can be characterized by the following features. First, exporting onto world markets is more lucrative than shipping onto the domestic or CIS market. Second, the Russian federal government has substantial leverage in the oil industry because it has a nearly monopoly position in allocating scarce transport capacity for world market exports. Third, the Russian federal government's 5 procedure for allocating export capacity is unrelated to efficiency criterion and is rather non-transparent. Fourth, the allocation rules did not change much in 1997-2003. Finally, besides controlling export quotas, the federal government also controls just the allocation of company world market exports through particular export routes that are differentiated by their costs. Druzhba and Russian ports are the cheapest export routes for Russian crude, and shipping through non-Russian countries to obtain access to world markets adds substantial costs.
Theory
This section develops a simple theory of just how differences in ownership can influence the state allocation of export quotas to companies. In our model, there is a state regulatory body that allocates export capacity, Q, in the form of access to a pipeline route to a company. In turn, the company chooses the share of its oil output that it exports on world markets and the share that goes to the domestic/CIS market. The world price exceeds the domestic/CIS price: P w > P d . This captures two features of the Russian oil market that we have already noted: first, world prices are usually higher and, second, many domestic and CIS refineries delay or simply withhold payments while this is not an issue on world markets. Formally, a company solves the following program:
L denotes a variable input such as labor, f(L) is a non-decreasing, continuous and concave production function that converts L into oil output, α is the share of output that is exported on world markets, (1-α) is the share shipped to the domestic-CIS market and Q denotes the export quota. The parameter β captures ownership; when β is close to unity the company has close full rights to it residual profits after choosing L, and is categorized as state-independent. As β falls and approaches zero the company has its most of its cash flows appropriated by the federal government and is classified as a state-influence company.
In this setup, when the export quota is non-binding, the company chooses α = 1 and exports all of its output to world markets. It also chooses L so that its marginal value product on world markets equals its marginal cost:
If the quota is binding, then Q = α*f(L) and the company sells (f(L) -Q) on domestic/CIS market. In this case, the shadow price of the quota is β(P w -P d ), which is the company's revenue simply lost by shifting a unit of output sales from the world to domestic-CIS market. The company now chooses L so that its marginal value product on domestic markets equals its marginal cost:
Equation (3) generates several predictions about the behavior of a quota constrained company. First, since cash flow rights apply to revenues net of variable costs, an increase in ownership rights has no impact on output or allocations of output to the world and domestic/CIS markets:
Furthermore, a relaxation of the quota induces a company to shift its sales from the domestic-CIS market to world markets without changing overall output:
We use this setup to make predictions about how the federal government regulatory agency chooses its optimal quota. Our basic premise is that the federal agency is driven by political criteria, and wins loyalty, favors and transfers in-kind when it has companies deliver cheap oil to its clients on the domestic-CIS market. To capture this idea, we denote the political benefits of quotas as Z(f (L) -Q) , where Z' > 0, Z'' < 0. The cost borne by the federal government is the loss in revenues by diverting from the world
Thus, the private ownership parameter, β, influences the federal government's costs of using a quota to force a company to ship on the domestic-CIS market. The federal government can pass a higher share of its costs of foregoing world market prices to a state-independent company that has a β close to unity.
However, in a state-influence company where β is much lower, the federal government picks up more of the cost.
When the quota is binding, the state chooses an optimal quota so that its marginal benefit equals its marginal cost:
Thus, a binding quota becomes tighter as private ownership increases. The logic of this result is that an increase in β depresses the marginal cost of diverting oil from the export to the domestic/CIS market. This result implies that the federal regulatory agencies would use their control over the oil export pipeline to discriminate against state-independent companies. We will take this prediction to the data in what follows.
Data
The data were acquired from Oil Trade, a statistical annex to Oil and Capital, a leading magazine for the Russian oil industry. Our dataset includes subsidiary level export volumes through different routes, measures of company size, regional production costs, transportation costs and the capacity of each pipeline route. In the dataset we report the exports of 32 subsidiaries in 1997 and 54 oil subsidiaries in 2003 through each possible route (there are eight export routes, but because some routes are very close to each other, we categorize shipments into seven possible routes).
Export Volumes.
Export volumes are reported in thousands of tons, and there is a negligible difference in the quality of oil exported by the subsidiaries. This is because after a company pumps oil into the transport pipeline, that oil is blended with all of the oil currently in the pipeline, so that at the final export destination oil generally priced on world markets as the Urals blend. 6 In the dataset we included exports of only those subsidiaries of mothers that reported production in 1997 and 2003, and reported production was higher than reported exports. The reason to exclude exporting subsidiaries with no reported production or reported exports higher than production is the possibility that they exported re-distributed oil. Russian mother companies can redistribute their output intended for export between the subsidiaries, i.e., a certain subsidiary may receive additional oil, produced by another subsidiary, for export. This redistribution does not change the receiving subsidiary's production costs, but affects its transportation costs. Since it is impossible to tell how much extra oil the subsidiary 6 The exceptions to this are exports from the Rosneft subsidiary in the Sakhalin area, which typically prices closer to Asian blends, and exports from companies using the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. However, these companies are excluded from our sample. We thank Michael Cohen from the Office of Energy Markets and End Use, the Department of Energy, for help with this issue.
received, the actual costs of the exporting subsidiary are impossible to calculate. There was one exporting subsidiary that did not report production in 1997 and four in 2003.
One in 1997 reported significantly higher exports than production; and, in 2003 all of the subsidiaries' exports were lower than reported production.
Company Size.
We use subsidiaries' number of total wells and number of operating wells as measures of its size. We find that both measures are highly correlated with total production: 0.79 for the number of total wells and 0.75 for the number of operating wells. Company size can pick up the importance of size for export access, which would include ability to produce and political influence.
Company Productivity.
We measure productivity as output per well and output per productive well. We would expect this variable to be positively associated with export access when access to world markets is based upon efficiency.
Regional Production Costs.
We use regional producers' price (rubles per ton) as a measure of regional production costs. The oil-producing subsidiaries included in the dataset are located in six different oil regions of Russia. Regional prices capture the region-specific production costs that vary between different regions due to different climate zones (e.g., Western Siberia vs. Volga) and had different levels of oil production development (e.g., old and high cost wells in the North Caucasus region vs. new, poorly developed production infrastructure in the North in the Komi Republic). We understand that this measure does not capture all company-specific production costs, but it is the best measure available since the mothers do not report their production costs. If access to world markets is based upon economic criteria, then we would expect that this variable would be negatively associated with exports on world markets.
Exports Routes. In 1997, Russian crude exports went through five routes
(Druzhba pipeline sub-system; ports of Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Ventspils and Odessa); in 2003, the number of export routes for Russain oil was seven (Druzhba and ports of Tuapse, Novorossiysk, Primorsk, Odessa, Yuzhnyi and Butinge) (see Figure 1) . We do not include the Yuzhnyi export route for 2003 since its exports account for less than 0.1% of total exports. Also, since Tuapse and Novorossyisk are located very close to each other, we unite these routes and report them as joint Tuapse-Novorossyik export route.
For this route, we use total exports that went through both ports and total joint capacity of the two ports. The distance of this route is calculated as average of the distances from a subsidiary to each port.
Thus, in the dataset we look at the total of four export routes in 1997 (Druzhba, Tuapse-Novorossyisk, Ventspils and Odessa) and five export routes in 2003 (Druzhba, Primorsk, Tuapse-Novorossyisk, Odessa and Butinge). Below we describe how we use data on distance to world market on each route and tariffs to compute transportation costs. However, we also control for routes to pick up additional factors that would determine the impact of routes on export access. Table 6 . We use distance in km from a subsidiary to ports or points of exit as a measure of distance from a subsidiary to a particular export point. Distance in km was defined by the shortest route from a subsidiary allocation to a port or Russian border (in case of Druzhba) along Transneft trunk pipelines. The location of a subsidiary was approximated either by location of its most productive fields or by location of its office. The information on the most productive fields was taken from mother companies' websites; the office addresses were obtained from the website of the Russian System of Full Information Disclosure and News "Skrin" (http://www.skrin.ru).
Transportation Costs
The data on the pipeline routes location was taken from Transneft's website (www.transneft.ru). To calculate distance between cities where the pipeline nodes are located, we used the AutoTransInfo website (http://www.ati.su/) that provides information on distances between Russian cities and towns along highways. We assume that the oil from a subsidiary enters the pipeline at the node-city that is closest to the location of the subsidiary. If the allocation of export capacity is related to efficiency considerations, then we would expect to observe a negative association for subsidiaries between export volumes on a particular route and transportation costs.
As a robustness check, we also use an alternative distance measure. Following Berkowitz (2000), alternative distance is measured in total numbers of Transneft regional sub-systems the subsidiary has to pump its oil through to get to the port or Russia border.
The two measures are highly correlated (0.84).
Route Capacity. Route capacity is reported for 2003 only. Capacity of each
export route is reported in million tons per year in Table 6 . For the Tuapse-Novorossyisk route we use the sum of the capacities of the two ports. Since the export system is capacity constrained, we would expect to observe a positive association between route capacity and export volumes.
Additional controls.
As additional control variables, we use route and mothers dummy variables. As previously noted, route dummy variables pick additional factors related to access besides transport costs and capacity, which could include long term relationships between a subsidiary and a particular regional Transneft company.
Mother dummies pick mother-specific factors such as political connections that could be important for access.
Empirical Results
We have compiled detailed data on export volumes by route, regional costs, We test our hypothesis using the km distance measure (results with the alternative measure are similar and are available upon request). In Table 7 ). In addition, the columns entitled StateIndependent and State-Influence presents estimates of the associations between our independent variables and oil exports for the subsidiaries. In each cell we first report point estimates, standard errors (in parentheses) and then quantitative significance: this is the point estimate for a regressor times its sample standard deviation; it measures the impact of a one-standard deviation increase in the independent variable on thousands of tons oil exports.
Checking column (1) in specifications 1 and 2, we fail to reject the hypothesis
that the state influence companies are not privileged because of regional production costs. However, it is clear from columns (2) and (3) in each specification that only the state-influence subsidiaries pay attention to regional production costs. A possible explanation of this finding is state-independents face tighter capacity constraints and will export as much as the federal government allows, while the state-influence companies can be more sensitive to costs.
We reject the hypothesis ( 0 4 = α ) that the state influence companies do not have preferential access due to their location at 1 % level in both specifications. Once again, the estimates in columns (2) and (3) suggest there is a major difference in treatment of state-independent versus state-influence subsidiaries. For example, the results in specification 2 imply that a one standard deviation increase in transport costs is associated with a 1.6 million ton cut in exports in the state-influence group and a 1.2 million ton increase in the state-independent group. This suggests that the shadow price of the quota is so high for the state-independent companies that when state-influence companies reduce their exports following an increase in transportation costs, the stateindependents pick up this slack capacity.
We also reject the hypothesis ( 0 6 = α ) regarding access to the routes with better capacity at 1 % level in both specifications. The point estimates and the quantitative significance parameters are striking in this case. For example, in specification 2, a onestandard deviation increase in route capacity (roughly 20.8 million tons in exports per year) is associated with roughly 1.9 million tons in additional exports in the average state-independent subsidiary; the average state-influence subsidiary will export 8.3 million tons more.
Finally, we reject the hypothesis ( 0 8 = α ) that there is no discrimination by subsidiary-productivity per well at the 1 % level. What is striking is that stateindependents export more on world markets only if they are more productive while productivity does not matter for state-influence subsidiaries.
Thus, there is strong evidence that in 2003 state-influence companies and stateindependent companies are not treated in the same way in the export allocation system. The state-independent companies are more efficient, but have relatively limited access to export routes. Moreover, since the shadow price of the export quota is high, the stateindependent companies are forced to behave inefficiently and export more when the transportation costs increase and extra export capacity frees up. These results also provide evidence that federal government control over the export pipeline is detrimental for efficiency. State-influence subsidiaries, on average, are less productive and yet get more access to pipeline capacity. costs and route capacity variables and let route dummy variables pick up all the fixed effects of the routes. Since these independent variables are only slightly correlated with the production costs and uncorrelated with other independent variables (see Table 8 ), the point estimates for the impact of productivity in 2003 should not be strongly affected; however, we do expect that the estimates for regional costs will change. Table 9 reports estimation results for 1997 and 2003 with number of total wells as a proxy of the companies' size (the results with operating wells are similar and available upon request). As expected, the point estimates for productivity per well in 2003 have not changed significantly compared to Table 7 ; regional production costs are changed but are not statistically significant. Consistent with our estimates from Table 7 , stateinfluence companies have privileged access because state-independent subsidiaries must be more productive to get the same access to world markets. However, in 1997 there is no such discrimination between state-influence and state-independent subsidiaries. 
Conclusion
Subsequent to the financial crisis of 1998, GDP in Russia has grown at an impressive average annual rate of more than 6% (CIA World Fact Book, 2005). One of the major concerns with this growth record, however, is that it is driven primarily by high oil prices rather than deep structural reform (see Berglöf et al, 2003) . In this paper we have documented that the Russian oil sector, which is one of Russia's most profitable sectors, is in need of substantial restructuring. Our results show that the partial privatization imposes major inefficiencies for several reasons. First, state-influence companies appear to adopt acquisitions policies that are driven by non-economic criterion. Second, the allocation of pipeline capacity is sensitive to transportation costs for state-influence enterprises, but it ignores these costs for state-independents. Third, state-influence companies benefit more from increased capacity of the export routes.
Finally, productivity is not important for access to the export pipeline for the stateinfluence companies.
Furthermore, the Russian federal government continues to influence the oil sector in ways that are of concern. In October 2003, the Russian federal government arrested Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the chairman of the management committee of Yukos; this was the beginning of a process by which this state-independent mother company was radically downsized. Most notably, in 2005 Yukos's biggest productive subsidiary was sold at roughly 60-percent of its market value to the state-owned mother company Rosneft Notes: Return on assets (non-current assets) in year is net income at the end of the year t divided by the average value of assets (non-current assets) on December 31 of year t and year t-1. Non-current assets equity include (most importantly) the net value of property, plant and equipment; it also includes equity investees and long-term investments at cost, deferred income tax assets and other long term assets. 
